Governance of a financially distressed firm is a complicated interplay of formal and informal control rights exercised by the firm's many stakeholders--its shareholders, managers, employees, and creditors, among others--subject to oversight and limits imposed by the law and courts. The relative influence of these groups shifts over time as a firm heads toward default. This leads to some striking stylized facts about distressed firms in the U.S.:
• Management and board turnover are extremely high, by some estimates reaching 90% for firms exiting Chapter 11.
• Conflicts between the interests of equity holders and creditors (or even among creditors of differing priority) become exaggerated, potentially distorting investment incentives.
• Banks and other creditors gain influence on firm decisions, as control rights are triggered by default.
• Assets of the firm are redeployed by new owners who have purchased assets or have gained control of the firm via a restructuring.
In this chapter, we describe the framework that determines when and how control rights are exercised, and the empirical evidence that gives us a description of how the governance of the distressed firm evolves. In the U.S., which is the primary focus of our analysis, Chapter 11 is the end game that influences the behavior of firms even prior to a default. As such, we first provide some brief background on the key provisions of Chapter 11 that are important to our understanding of the firm's governance. We then examine in turn the role of each of the firm's main constituencies who influence a potential restructuring.
I. Overview of the Legal Environment 2
From a governance perspective, one of the crucial features of a Chapter 11 filing is that the debtor remains in possession; in other words, the debtor's pre-bankruptcy managers can continue to manage the firm through the reorganization process. Allowing management to stay in control is thought to provide continuity and removes a disincentive to delay filing until the last minute.
1 The bankruptcy court can remove management in favor of a trustee, but such appointments are rare in practice and tend to occur only in cases of fraud or extreme mismanagement. Bankruptcy law does not, however, deprive the debtor's board of directors of the power to replace management, and managerial turnover in and around bankruptcy is commonplace.
The bankruptcy filing itself puts in place an "automatic stay" that limits creditor collection activities such as suing on debts and seizing collateral. Hence, the Bankruptcy Code provides substitute mechanisms to protect creditors that limit the debtor's control rights over firm assets. For example, courts must approve the terms of the debtor's post-bankruptcy credit facility (called debtor-in-possession, or DIP, financing). Courts must also approve sales of assets outside the ordinary course of business. Courts can limit the use of assets subject to a security interest as necessary to protect the creditor's interest in the collateral.
As is well-known, the traditional Chapter 11 reorganization requires a plan that determines the disposition of the firm's assets, places investors into classes, and allocates the proceeds of the assets across classes. Management has an exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan during the first 120 days of bankruptcy, and this exclusivity period can be extended by the court up to a maximum of 18 months. To confirm a plan consensually, a
proponent must obtain a sufficient share of votes (2/3 in value and ½ in number) in each class of impaired claims and interests. As the plan is a negotiated outcome, it can be approved by the 3 court even if it provides for distributions that violate the absolute priority of the claimants, i.e.
junior claimants may receive some distribution even when more senior creditors have not been paid in full. Alternatively, the plan can be confirmed through a "cramdown", which requires convincing a judge that the absolute priority rule is satisfied with respect to impaired classes that do not approve the plan.
The Code provides that committees may be appointed to represent certain classes, increasing their voice and influence on the restructuring. The U.S. Trustee's office, which oversees the administration of bankruptcy cases, typically appoints an unsecured creditors committee. This committee has the power to investigate the debtor's operations and finances, and to consult with the debtor on the plan of reorganization. Other committees must be approved by the court. For example, equity committees are much less frequently formed when it is clear to the court that equity has no remaining economic stake. Committee members, having access to non-public information regarding the development of the plan, are restricted from trading in the claims of the firm while serving in that role.
Overall, the process of developing the plan, distributing its details to the voting parties in a disclosure statement, soliciting votes, and obtaining court approval for the plan can lead to substantial cost and delay. The process has changed to some degree in recent years, however, as it has become increasingly common for firms to achieve a de-facto reorganization by selling the firm's assets as a going concern to a new entity with a healthier capital structure. This can be done outside a plan of reorganization under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. Because a creditor vote is not required in advance, the Section 363 sale provides a faster means of disposing of the firm's assets. Section 363(f), moreover, allows for assets to be sold free and 4 clear of liens and other obligations, such as product liability claims, that might otherwise follow the assets to the buyer.
Given the many parties that exercise control rights in distress, we will proceed by analyzing theory and evidence regarding the influence of each of the major constituencies in turn. In Section II, we summarize the relevant literature on shareholders, managers, and boards.
Sections III and IV discuss senior and junior creditors, respectively. Section V discusses the role of law, courts, and judges, and concludes with some brief suggestions for future research.
II. Shareholders, Managers and Boards

II.a. The role of shareholders
As the firm becomes financially distressed, shareholders are increasingly "out of the money," raising two important governance concerns. First, to the extent that equity still has control rights, do equity holders (or management acting on their behalf) take actions to preserve their option-like value, perhaps at the expense of the ultimately recoverable firm value? Second, when does (or should) equity lose its control rights, and what role do equity holders have in a restructuring when that does occur?
Actions that benefit "out of the money" equity A number of theoretical papers warn that the limited liability feature of equity provides incentives for excessive risk taking when the firm is distressed, particularly prior to a bankruptcy filing (these include Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992) , White (1996), and Hart (2000) ). Paying 5 dividends to the equity holders of an already highly levered firm could also be viewed as symptomatic of this conflict (Hotchkiss, Smith and Stromberg, 2012) .
Empirical evidence of this behavior has been elusive, and it may be the case that there are other factors which mitigate these incentives. For example, Eckbo and Thorburn (2003) suggest that the potential for managers to be rehired when a firm exits bankruptcy could limit incentives for risk shifting. They examine a sample of 170 bankruptcies in Sweden (between 1988 and 1991) where, unlike the U.S., the CEO loses control of the firm upon filing, a trustee is appointed, and the firm is auctioned. Income losses to CEOs of bankrupt firms are very large, indicating the personally costly nature of the filing. However, by investing conservatively, the CEO increases the probability that he/she will be rehired by the restructured firm. Other researchers have noted that restrictive loan or bond covenants could also limit risk shifting behavior. Gormley and Matsa (2011) suggest that the agency problem between risk-averse managers and risk-seeking equity holders may explain the relative scarcity of risk-seeking in distress. Consistent with this idea, they find evidence that managers whose firms are exposed to carcinogen liability are more likely to acquire cash-rich firms in unrelated industries to reduce bankruptcy risk.
The incentives of equity holders to increase risky investment should similarly provide incentives to delay default or filing, to the extent those events trigger a loss of equity's control rights. Within the asset pricing literature, much of the existing theory of defaultable corporate debt focuses on equity holders' optimal default policy. Using a contingent-claims framework, Black and Cox (1976) and Geske (1977) value coupon-paying debt and solve for the equity holders' optimal default policy when asset sales are restricted. Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) , Leland (1994) , Leland and Toft (1996) , Leland (1998) , and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland
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(2000) examine default policy in the problem of optimal capital structure. In practice, since the optimal filing point is unobservable, we cannot readily determine whether filings are in fact delayed to the benefit of equity holders. In their empirical study of failures subsequent to highly leveraged transactions (HLTs), Andrade and Kaplan (1998) examine qualitative description of actions taken by 31 distressed firms, and find that 14 firms took actions that delayed the resolution of distress, and that the delay appears to have been costly for at least 9 firms. Adler, Capkun and Weiss (2006) suggest that the firm will be in worse financial condition at the time of filing if it has delayed (see Section III.b. below).
Once in bankruptcy, the change in legal environment may make it more difficult to increase risky investment on behalf of equity. As explained above, the incumbent management remains in control of the firm's operations in bankruptcy, but management is not free to act in the interests of shareholders alone. Most important actions require court approval and provide the opportunity for interested parties to object. Nevertheless, it may still be possible for management to take actions benefiting shareholders. For example, constituencies may disagree as to the best operating strategy for the firm, or whether certain asset sales, and the timing of these sales, are in the best interest of the overall bankruptcy estate.
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While direct evidence of risk shifting is sparse, continued investment in the existing assets of a failing company could be considered as risky investment, since immediate liquidation might provide a greater recovery value. An extreme illustration of the potential magnitude of creditor/shareholder conflicts in this setting is given by Weiss and Wruck (1998) More generally, larger sample evidence on this type of behavior is difficult to produce. In their same study of 31 distressed HLTs, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) find no evidence of risk shifting or asset substitution, which they define as large investments in unusually risky capital expenditures, projects, or acquisitions. Overall, it remains somewhat debatable whether management engages in riskier investment on behalf of equity holders, or whether they act more conservatively as the firm becomes distressed.
Equity control rights
Outside Chapter 11, shareholder control is subject to two limitations. The first stems from the shifting fiduciary obligations of the board of directors, since those fiduciary responsibilities expand to include the creditors of the company once the firm is near insolvency (Branch, 2000) .
The second limitation stems from the rights of creditors if the firm either violates covenants in its debt agreements or defaults on a contractual payment. We discuss each of these in turn in Section II.c. and Section III below.
Shareholders can retain some influence over outcomes in distress through several mechanisms. First, shareholders retain their formal rights to replace the board and management inside and outside bankruptcy. Second, shareholders can represent their interests in bankruptcy through official committees, and they retain the rights to vote on a reorganization plan. The equity class must approve any consensual plan of reorganization, and cramdown is generally regarded as a more costly, time-consuming alternative because the firm must be valued to 8 determine entitlements. The delay inherent in confirming a cramdown plan can give shareholders bargaining power.
Evidence for shareholder bargaining power can be found in the prevalence of deviations from priority toward equity, especially in the early days of the Bankruptcy Code. For example, Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt (1990), Franks and Torous (1989), and Betker (1995) of cases in the 1980s. They also find that deviations from priority in favor of equity are more likely when management has greater shareholdings, providing greater incentive to act in equity's interest. Each of these empirical studies examines firms that were publicly registered companies prior to their bankruptcy; in private companies where management has a greater or even 100% stake, management has more incentive to act in behalf of equity interests. At the other extreme, even when management has no economic ties to equity, deviations from absolute priority may reflect the desire to reach a consensual plan outcome more quickly by paying equity holders their "nuisance" value.
II.b. The role of managers
Since management has the ability to stay in control even as a debtor in possession in
Chapter 11, it is important to understand how their incentives, and therefore actions, are likely to be affected by financial distress. Early discussion of the merits of the Chapter 11 system included criticism that the process was too protective of incumbent management, allowing them to retain 9 too much control and failing to punish managers for poor performance (Bradley and Rosenzweig, 1992 show that managers who remain on average take cuts to their compensation, and that CEO replacements from within the firm earn 35% less than their predecessor. This evidence suggests strongly the costly nature of distress for firms' managers.
More recently, Eckbo, Thorburn and Wang (2012) dollars), or three times the typical annual compensation. To the extent that financial distress is a costly event, it will have a strong impact on managers' behavior prior to distress, providing incentives to choose lower leverage or less risky investments.
Given the complicated interplay of formal and informal control rights in bankruptcy, it remains an open empirical question: whose interests does management actually represent when a firm is distressed? There are reasons to expect management to be aligned with different constituencies depending on the circumstances of the case. When management has a large equity ownership stake prior to default, it has an incentive to preserve that value by pursuing equity's interests in a restructuring. On the other hand, management's loyalties may shift to the group that will control the company subsequent to the reorganization. For example, Gilson, Hotchkiss, and
Ruback (2000) argue that sometimes management will form a coalition with senior creditors when it is likely that this group will control the company subsequent to a restructuring. At the other end of the capital structure, new owners that contribute equity to an emerging firm may choose to keep the incumbent management in place (Gilson, Hotchkiss and Ruback, 2000) , similar to the behavior documented by Eckbo and Thorburn (2003) .
II.c. The role of the board
In non-distressed settings, much of the discussion of the role of the board in our postSarbanes Oxley environment involves whether boards are effective monitors, and how best to populate the board with insider vs. independent members. Much of that discussion becomes to some degree of secondary importance when the firm is distressed. Key questions involving the board become: where do their fiduciary duties lie if the firm is insolvent (and how is insolvency identified)? What happens when existing board members need to be replaced, and what interests do new board members typically represent?
The fiduciary duties of managers and directors to shareholders expand to the corporation, specifically including creditors, when the firm is in the "zone of insolvency." 3 Though the firm is generally insolvent upon filing a bankruptcy petition, there is an obvious measurement problem in determining the point in time prior to filing where insolvency occurs. Further, from the Credit Lyonnais case, the duty to creditors applies when the company is near insolvency, perhaps applying to the firm with serious operating problems.
Becker and Stromberg (2012) creditors not when the firm is insolvent, but rather when it is in the "zone" of insolvency. They compare Delaware corporations to firms incorporated elsewhere before and after this ruling; in this way, they can show that the ruling increased the likelihood of equity issues, increased investment, and reduced firm risk for firms that were relatively closer to default. Thus, the ruling limited manager's incentives to take actions favoring equity over debt for firms near financial distress.
Determining at a given time whether a firm is at the point (or zone) of insolvency requires a valuation of the firm as a going concern, and therefore depends on the expected future performance of the company. Different constituencies may have different outlooks on the subsequent prospects of the firm, i.e. whether a decline is permanent or temporary (see figure 1, p. 423, Wruck (1989) ). For example, Hotchkiss (1995) studies the cash flow forecasts issued by management (in disclosure statements) for firms in Chapter 11, and shows that firms' incumbent management is on average overly optimistic in projecting future cash flows for a reorganized company.
The difficulties in determining in whose interest the board should be acting are exacerbated when the constituencies have conflicting interests. More senior claimants will tend to favor a liquidation of assets, particularly if it would lead to a full recovery of their claims at that point in time. Shareholders and possibly junior creditors, who potentially gain from a rebound in the value of the firm's assets, are more biased toward continuation of the firm's operations. Thus, if representing only shareholders, management and the board would be likely to support the actions described above which benefit shareholders such as delayed filing, asset substitution, increased risk taking, or simply failure to liquidate poorly performing assets. When fiduciary duties expand to creditors, however, the board theoretically may support actions which help creditors but impair equity value. This conflict can be particularly problematic when management is also a large shareholder of the firm.
A significant number of incumbent board members resign when firms become distressed. Gilson (1990) is the first to study the composition of the board for distressed firms. One source of new board members is investors who aim to have a longer term stake in the restructured company, often gaining control of the restructured firm. This type of active "vulture" investor is studied by Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997) . While some distressed investors aim to passively gain from increases in value of the claims they hold, many become active in governance on the firm's board (while some ultimately gain control of the firm and/or assume management positions). They find that vultures join boards of 27% of the firms in their sample of 288 firms defaulting on public debt between 1980 and 1993, and retain these positions for at least one year post-restructuring for more than half of their sample.
III. Senior secured creditors
While equity holder value maximization is consistent with maximizing the total value of the non-distressed firm, senior creditors may prefer a less risky strategy that preserves the value of their claims. Thus, if senior lenders are in control, they may induce the firm to implement a suboptimal investment and financial policy. On the other hand, if the firm is deeply insolvent, senior creditors may in fact be the residual claimants, and as such promote firm value maximization. Chapter 11 determines the relative bargaining power of the different claimholders.
Since voluntary out-of-court workouts are negotiated under the threat of bankruptcy filing, the outcome is substantially influenced by the allocation of control rights in Chapter 11. In this section, we survey studies of senior lender control over the firm in financial distress and bankruptcy.
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III.a. Senior lender control in financial distress
As discussed above, managerial turnover rates increase when the firm performs poorly.
Interestingly, a large fraction of these management changes are initiated by senior lenders. In Gilson's (1989) study of 381 public firms that experience large stock price declines in 1979-1984, one-fifth of the management departures are initiated by bank lenders. While creditors do not own equity, they are able to force management changes by threatening shareholders with bankruptcy or to petition to the court to have a trustee appointed.
Bank lenders also try to align managerial incentives by tying the compensation of the firm's top executives to creditor wealth. Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) report that over ten percent of their sample firms enact plans that explicitly tie CEO compensation or wealth to the value of creditors' claims. This may or may not maximize the value of the firm. If banks are the residual claimants, such a compensation policy is consistent with firm value maximization.
However, if a junior claim is the "fulcrum" security, it risks implementing a strategy that preserves the value of senior claims at the expense of junior creditors.
4
Banks further influence the selection of directors in distressed firms. Gilson (1990) shows that banks affect the outcome of board elections and sometimes influence board membership directly, for example, by letting bank executives join the board while the firm is restructuring its debt. Such a strategy is not without problems, however. In particular, banks must balance a direct control over the firm with an increased risk of becoming a target of lender liability law-suits.
Several studies emphasize the role of covenants as an important governance mechanism for bank lenders. In particular, these covenants become stricter after a distressed restructuring. Gilson (1990) terms, including reduced funding, shorter maturity, a higher frequency of collateral requirement and more restrictive financial covenants. There is also an increased likelihood of forced CEO turnover in the quarter that a firm violates its covenants. Importantly, the firm's operating performance and stock returns both improve following a technical default, suggesting that the increased creditor governance create value for shareholders.
Banks also play a role in the firm's decision to restructure out-of-court versus under
Chapter 11. Gilson, John and Lang (1990) examine this choice for 169 public companies that became severely financially distressed in 1978-1987. They find that a distressed firm is more likely to recontract out-of-court when it has a larger fraction of bank debt in its capital structure, there are fewer lenders, and it has a relatively large fraction of intangible assets.
As the financially distressed firm is restructured, senior creditors frequently end up as major stockholders. While banks and other financial institutions typically are prohibited to own stock in nonfinancial firms, there are exceptions for equity obtained in a debt restructuring or bankruptcy reorganization plan. 5 Gilson (1990) the firm has public debt, banks rarely make concessions unless public debtholders also exchange their claims for equity (Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) make a similar point). In half of the restructurings where banks take equity, the firm has public debt outstanding. However, banks will not take equity without a restructuring of the public debt. The likelihood that the bank takes equity decreases with the proportion of public debt and increases with the firm's growth opportunities (market-to-book ratio). Firms in which banks take equity are more cash-flow constrained and have poorer operating performance prior to the restructuring. However, these firms have better cash-flow performance after the restructuring than firms with no bank ownership.
Not only is a restructuring of the public debt critical to the participation of banks, but bank concessions are also important for the success of the public debt exchange. Using a sample of 68 distressed debt exchange offers in the 1980s, James (1996) shows that exchange offers accompanied by bank concessions are associated with a greater reduction of the public debt outstanding and are more likely to succeed than restructurings where banks do not participate.
He suggests that banks help reduce information asymmetries and thus holdout problems among the public debt holders.
Gilson (1997) examines leverage changes for 108 firms that file for Chapter 11 or restructure their debt out of court in 1979-1989. He documents that leverage ratios remain relatively high after financially distressed firms recontract with their creditors and particularly high for firms that restructure in a workout. He suggests that transaction costs limit the extent to which creditors are willing to reduce their debt when distressed firms restructure out of court.
Such transactions costs include various regulations that discourage lenders from writing down their principal and exchanging debt for equity, tax disadvantages, and holdout problems. involves fewer long-term debt contracts, a higher debt ownership concentration, and greater flexibility in debt repayment.
Overall, the evidence indicates that senior creditors play an active role in corporate governance and the restructuring of distressed firms outside of bankruptcy
III.b. Senior lender control rights in bankruptcy
Once a firm files for Chapter 11, pre-bankruptcy secured lenders can no longer enforce the rights triggered by loan covenant violations, due to bankruptcy's automatic stay.
Nevertheless, banks and other secured lenders have become more adept in controlling a firm's activity before and during the bankruptcy. Pre-bankruptcy lines of credit can limit the borrower's access to cash to fund operations, putting the lender in control of the timing of a filing. Lenders can take a security interest in a debtor's entire asset base, leaving less free assets available for other potential lenders and hence, limiting a borrower's liquidity. Once in bankruptcy, debtor-inpossession loans also increasingly dictate the outcomes of bankruptcy cases in direct and indirect ways. These important trends were first brought to light in the law literature (Skeel 2003 Interestingly, most of these credit facilities are originated in the year prior to bankruptcy filing.
Through the security interest in the firm's assets, senior lenders effectively get control over the company's access to cash and thus the timing of its bankruptcy filing. Moreover, the firm cannot raise additional funds in bankruptcy without the permission of, or offering adequate protection to, the pre-petition secured lenders. As a result, these loans help senior lenders to obtain control rights inside and outside bankruptcy.
An important way for senior creditors to gain control over the bankrupt firm's day-to-day decisions is to provide additional financing in bankruptcy through a debtor-in-possession (DIP) loan. Dahiya, John, Puri and Ramirez (2003) examine 538 firms that file for Chapter 11 in the period 1988-1997. One third of the firms in their sample obtain a DIP loan, a majority (58%) of which are provided by a pre-petition lender. There is an increasing trend in the use of DIP financing, with a higher fraction of firms obtaining DIP loans in the second half of the sample period. Larger firms, retail firms, and firms with more current assets are more likely to get DIP financing in bankruptcy. Hedge fund presence has become a defining characteristic of the process, with hedge funds taking positions in 90 percent of the bankrupt sample firms. Hedge funds primarily invest in unsecured debt because it often is the fulcrum security, i.e. the debt class that gets converted into 23 equity in the restructured firm. When hedge funds purchase junior debt claims, there is a higher likelihood of competing reorganization plans, CEO turnover and adoption of key employee retention plans (KERP). Moreover, hedge fund presence increases the probability that the distressed firm successfully restructures, which is typically associated with higher total recovery rates and higher payoffs to junior creditors, often in the form of equity. The evidence is consistent with hedge funds bringing efficiency gains when they invest in distressed debt.
The role of hedge funds is also studied by Lim (2010) claims is associated with a faster restructuring and a higher probability of a going-concern sale, 24 but lower total recovery rates. Overall, vulture investors appear to fill an important governance role in the restructuring of distressed firms.
The valuation of the bankrupt firm plays an integral role for the distribution of value under the reorganization plan. Underestimating the firm's value increases the proportion of the value that goes to senior creditors, while overestimating the value allows junior creditors to get a free option on the reorganized firm. Gilson, Hotchkiss and Ruback (2000) Motors cases have raised issues of government control and priority in "managed" bankruptcies, and exposed controversies regarding the "363 sale" as a substitute for traditional reorganization.
V.a. Venue and Chapter Choice
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A debtor filing for bankruptcy in the U.S. typically has a choice of several venues in which to file its bankruptcy petition, which include the district of the debtor's principal place of business, and the district that includes the company's state of incorporation. 8 This menu of options has led to patterns whereby one venue becomes the preferred "forum of choice" for debtors that seek to file outside their home district. In the 1980's, the Southern District of New York (SDNY) was the preferred forum of choice, but Delaware became the dominant forum in the 1990s. In the last decade, Delaware and SDNY have shared prominence. Scholars have tried to determine the reasons why companies choose certain venues and the consequences of these choices; i.e. whether venue choice produces a "race to the top" or a "race to the bottom".
The "race to the bottom" view is most associated with a series of papers by Lynn
LoPucki and co-authors (Eisenberg and LoPucki 1999 , LoPucki and Kalin 2001 , LoPucki and Doherty 2002 , LoPucki 2005 . Under this view, courts compete for cases that offer more favorable outcomes to the constituencies that drive the venue decision-debtors, their managers, and their attorneys in particular-at the expense of overall value. The main evidence supporting this view is that Delaware and SDNY reorganizations were observed as more likely than reorganizations in other courts to re-file for Chapter 11 a second time (informally known as a "Chapter 22"), and exhibit weaker financial performance following emergence. LoPucki (2005) argues that this evidence is consistent with an inefficient, laissez-faire approach to scrutinizing reorganization plans. In effect, this perspective leads to a normative argument for greater court control over plans of reorganization.
Much of the literature on venue choice disputes these conclusions on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, the main criticism of these studies is the reliance on refiling rates as a measure of bankruptcy court effectiveness (Rasmussen and Thomas 2001) . For example, Kahl (2002) suggests that firms emerging from bankruptcy might be optimally kept on a "short leash" through higher leverage, so as to limit agency costs of inefficient continuation.
This implies that higher refiling rates in a particular court can be consistent with a more efficient bankruptcy process.
Empirically, scholars have noted the potential selection biases that might lead firms with higher unobserved refiling propensities to file in Delaware or New York, leading to a mistaken inference that venue choice causes failure (Skeel 2001 ). In addition, subsequent studies have found a countervailing advantage of speed in Delaware cases, and evidence that a Delaware filing is more likely when the company's home court has handled less Chapter 11 cases, suggesting a preference for experience Skeel 2004, 2006) . In addition to choosing venue, debtors (and sometimes, creditors) choose the chapter under which the case is filed. There has been very little empirical literature examining differences across bankruptcy chapters, perhaps because of the very different circumstances under which Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and Chapter 13 filings might occur. Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) take on these challenges and present evidence against the notion that Chapter 11 is a slower, more costly means of reallocating assets than Chapter 7. Controlling for non-random selection into a chapter, they find that asset value is preserved less in Chapter 7, and time spent in bankruptcy is not significantly shorter in Chapter 7 once self-selection into a chapter is taken into account.
V.b. Judges
Framing the bankruptcy judge's decision problem as a real option/optimal stopping problem has proven fruitful in the small business bankruptcy context as well. Morrison (2007) analyzes a sample of 95 Chapter 11 filings in the Northern District of Illinois in 1998. The study finds, contrary to received wisdom, that judges generally make quick shutdown decisions of nonviable firms by dismissing cases or converting them to Chapter 7. Over 70 percent of shutdowns occurred within six months of the bankruptcy petition. The time to shutdown, moreover, is positively correlated with proxies for uncertainty about going-concern value, consistent with judicial maximization of the real option.
As noted above in the venue choice literature, establishing causal effects of courts and judges has proven difficult. Chang and Schoar (2007) provide a notable exception, by exploiting random assignment of cases to judges within a judicial district. The random assignment allows for identification of differential tendencies across judges to approve "pro-debtor" and "procreditor" motions. 10 Chang and Schoar find significant effects of judicial bias on bankruptcy outcomes and post-bankruptcy performance. Surprisingly, they find that pro-debtor judges The general notion that assets sold by financially distressed firms are sold at a discount relative to similar sales by healthy sellers is supported by the evidence in Pulvino (1998 Pulvino ( , 1999 on distressed and non-distressed sales of aircraft. In a different auction setting, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) document a greater discount in piecemeal sales of assets in Swedish mandatory bankruptcy auctions when the firm's industry peers are financially distressed. However, they find no evidence of a fire-sale discount when the bankrupt firms are sold as going concerns.
The literature highlights several reasons why fire sale problems may arise. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) Ayotte and Skeel (2006) raise the concern that DIP lenders are sometimes asset purchasers in 363 sales. 12 Ayotte and Morrison (2009) 
The Auto Bankruptcies
The controversy over 363 sales reached new heights in the wake of the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies in 2009. Both companies used the 363 sale mechanism to reorganize their capital structures. The Chrysler 363 sale generated the most discussion in the academic literature due to the distribution of value: secured creditors received $2 billion in cash in exchange for their secured claims, for a recovery of only 29 cents on the dollar. Chrysler (unsecured) employee benefit claimants received debt and stock in the new Chrysler. In this sense, the outcome can be seen as a deviation from priority: some unsecured claims received value, while secured claims were not paid in full.
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The legal literature following the case debated whether the Chrysler outcome was a severe departure from existing, and ideal, bankruptcy law practice. Under one view (Roe and Skeel 2010) , the Chrysler 363 sale dictated both the terms of the sale and the allocation of proceeds (sometimes called a sub rosa plan of reorganization). In these settings courts should, and often do, impose conditions on 363 sales that mimic creditor protections in a traditional reorganization. Morrison (2010) , by contrast, argues that Chrysler is typical of modern bankruptcy practice in 363 sales, in which the DIP lender (in Chrysler, the government) controls the timing and terms of the sale. The decision to use taxpayer money to buy Chrysler and allocate a share to retirees can be seen as a question of bailout policy-one that is separate from the bankruptcy law question about whether the auction of Chrysler's assets yielded full value. In this regard, though, the most consistent criticism of the Chrysler bankruptcy in the literature is that the bankruptcy auction was not set up to yield the highest price for the assets. The bidding procedures approved by the court effectively prevented bids that would liquidate Chrysler (Adler 2010 , Baird 2011 .
Though the Chrysler case generated important questions about the proper use of 363 sales, the long-run impact of the case is probably limited. The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's opinion authorizing the sale, which limits its impact on legal precedent.
Empirical evidence on the short-run economic impact is mixed. Anginer and Warburton (2010) find that bond markets did not respond significantly to any news about the Chrysler bankruptcy, but bonds of unionized firms outperformed bonds of non-unionized firms in response to news about the bailout loans that preceded the bankruptcy. Blaylock, Edwards and Stanfield (2011), on the other hand, find that more unionized firms perform relatively worse on several Chrysler-32 related event days up to and including the date of the bankruptcy filing. But they do not find any relative differences in bond price reactions to any legal events after the filing.
Suggestions for future research
These recent bankruptcy developments provide many open avenues for future research.
The most interesting questions, moreover, can benefit from theory and empirical evidence combined with detailed institutional and legal knowledge. For example, the increasing use of can benefit from the expertise of both economists and legal scholars. 4 The most senior class of claims which would be impaired if value were to be distributed according to absolute priority is referred to as the "fulcrum" security. 6 Such regulations restrict how much equity lenders can hold in nonfinancial firms and require banks to increase their risk-based regulatory capital when holding riskier assets such as stock.
7 See also Dhillon, Noe, and Ramirez (2007) , Carapeto (1999) , and Chatterjee, Dhillon and Ramirez (2004) for evidence on DIP financing in Chapter 11.
8 A debtor can choose to file for bankruptcy in any of four locations: the district where the corporation is domiciled, the district where the debtor has its principal place of business, the district where its principal assets are located, or any district where an affiliate of the debtor has already filed for bankruptcy. 10 As Chang and Schoar acknowledge, the "pro-debtor/pro-creditor" categorization may not be clear-cut. For example, a lifting of the automatic stay might benefit a secured creditor at the expense of unsecured creditors. A sale of assets may benefit the debtor's management (who might be rehired by the purchaser in a going-concern sale) or it may be driven by secured creditor control over the debtor.
11 As noted above, Eckbo and Thorburn (2003) also find that a high fraction of incumbent managers are rehired by firms restructured through Swedish auction bankruptcy. Contrary to LoPucki and Doherty (2007) , they suggest that these managers have firm specific skills, which make them the best candidates to continue run the reorganized firms. Eckbo and Thorburn (2003) find no difference in the post-bankruptcy operating performance between firms rehiring old management and firms hiring new outside management, indicating that there are no systematic differences in their management skills.
